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In the more than 30 years following the all-volunteer force (AVF), the proportion of women 
serving in the military has increased from 1.8 percent just before the AVF to 14.2 percent in 
2008. The majority of women do not stay in the military for a 20-year or longer career; like men, 
most women only serve a few years before transitioning to the civilian workforce. Although the 
fraction of the military who are women has risen, as has the fraction of veterans who are women, 
little research informs how female veterans of the AVF fare economically after leaving service, 
or whether military service benefits minority women who serve in such disproportionate 
numbers. This paper investigates the civilian employment experiences of female veterans of the 
AVF using two sources of data. First, population-based data from the American Community 
Survey are used to evaluate the employment experiences of female veterans. Second, data from 
an audit study of civilian hiring practices provides additional insight into the experiences of 
women veterans transitioning from military to civilian work. We find little evidence of a veteran 
labor market disadvantage, either for white or black women. Both groups exhibit strong patterns 
of labor force attachment. Only white women show slightly lower rates of employment (among 
those in the labor force), while black women veterans show consistently advantageous 
employment profiles. These positive employment outcomes among female veterans at least partly 
derive from employer preference for hiring veterans over equally qualified nonveteran women. 
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In the more than 30 years following the all-volunteer force (AVF) the proportion of women 
serving in the military has increased from 1.8 percent just before the AVF to 14.2 percent in 
2008. At the same time, the black women have dramatically increased their representation in the 
armed forces. Now, more than 33 percent of the women in the military and more than 42 percent 
of those in the Army are black. Most of these women do not stay in the military for a 20 or more 
year career; like men, most women only serve a few years before transitioning to the civilian 
workforce. Although female representation in the ranks of the military has risen and the racial 
composition of the female military population has grown less demographically representative of 
the civilian workforce, little research has been done on how the growing numbers of female 
veterans fare economically after leaving service, or whether the effects of military service differ 
for minority women. 
This paper uses a combination of observational and experimental data to investigate several 
questions related to the incorporation of female veterans into the civilian labor market. First, we 
seek to understand whether female veterans and nonveterans exhibit similar rates of labor market 
participation and employment, and whether these patterns vary by race. Second, we investigate 
explanations for veteran/nonveteran differences in employment among women by using an audit 
study of hiring in the civilian labor market. The audit study enhances the study of military service 
and labor market outcomes in several ways. Prior research has used observational and survey 
data poorly suited to separate the causal effect of military service per se. Direct observation of 
employer response to equivalent applicants in the proposed experiment provides explicit causal 
evidence of differential treatment based on prior military service. The audit study provides a 
unique contribution to the theoretical literature on the consequences of military service by 
focusing attention on employers as key actors moderating veterans’ transitions from military to 2 
 
civilian life. Employers are central in most theoretical explanations for differing returns to 
service, yet prior empirical research focuses on veterans as the unit of observation and analysis. 
The paper proceeds by first reviewing previous research on veterans’ employment and 
earnings as key indications of labor market success. We highlight studies focused on women and 
draw insight from a larger body of research on male veterans where research on female veterans 
is lacking. We follow with a description of the observational data from the 2005–2007 American 
Community Survey and follow with a brief description of our experimental procedures. Finally 
we present the results of the observational and experimental data analyses and discuss the 
implications of our findings for further research connecting military service and work over the 
lifecourse. 
MILITARY SERVICE AND CIVILIAN LABOR MARKET OUTCOMES 
A relatively large body of research has examined the labor market consequences of military 
service among men. This work has spanned generations, studying veterans of several eras (World 
War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Cold War, and the AVF). Much of this work 
focuses on the earnings of veterans compared with nonveterans, treating earnings as the key 
indicator of labor market success. This study instead sees employment as the primary indicator of 
labor market success. Finding the first postmilitary job is perhaps the single largest hurdle facing 
new veterans and the first postservice civilian job plays a key role in establishing postservice 
wage levels and future wage trajectories. 3 
 
Prior research on employment among male veterans suggests they have higher employment 
rates than their civilian peers and that the veteran advantage is especially high among African 
Americans. Angrist (1998) used Social Security data linked with military administrative records 
to study the impact of veteran status on employment and earnings among men. A simple 
comparison of means suggests veterans had higher employment and earnings, and that most of 
the documented veteran wage premium stemmed from these employment differences. He 
employed multiple statistical techniques to control for the selectivity of veterans including 
regression, matching (of military applicants who did and did not eventually enlist), and an 
instrumental variables model that capitalized on the misnorming of the military entrance test 
from 1976. In the years when most men were transitioning between military service and civilian 
employment, white veterans experienced anywhere from 1 percent lower to 5 percent higher 
employment rates (depending on the statistical model), while black veterans experienced 5–9 
percent higher employment rates over their civilian peers. Thus, black veterans had higher 
employment rates, net of a host of controls for demographic characteristics and selectivity of 
military service, while white veterans experienced virtually no difference. Because differences in 
employment may drive wage differences between veterans and nonveterans, our current research 
focuses attention on employment and more specifically on the initial job transition between 
military and civilian employment. 
In studying the role of school enrollment and military enlistment on the increase in 
employment with age, Mare, Winship, and Kubitschek (1984) find military veterans faced high 
rates of joblessness in moving from military service to the civilian labor market. Using probit 
models predicting the probability of employment among out-of-school men, they find a negative 
effect of veteran status on employment probability, but that the veteran penalty diminished with 4 
 
age. They also find that the veteran employment penalty is similar to the employment challenges 
facing recent school leavers. Their results suggest that in both the school and military transitions 
to the labor force, there may be a substantial job search before applicants find work. In this 
project, we focus on how employers evaluate applicants making the transition from military to 
work compared to a recent college graduate. 
Two earlier studies of the employment experiences of Vietnam veterans are noteworthy. In 
one study, when presented with profiles of two equally qualified fictitious job applicants, one of 
whom had served in Vietnam, middle managers made lower recommendations to hire the veteran 
and perceived the veteran applicant to have a higher probability of psychological problems 
(Bordieri and Drehmer 1984). On the other hand, surveying more than 500 personnel officers, 
D’Anton (1983) found that Vietnam veteran status increased the acceptability of black male job 
applicants with combat veterans rated more highly than noncombat veterans, who outranked 
black nonveterans. However, the opposite pattern was found for white veterans; white combat 
veterans were rated most negatively, followed by noncombat veterans and finally white 
nonveterans received the most favorable ratings. These prior studies are limited in that neither 
observed real hiring practices of these agents when they were unaware they were being observed. 
Taken together, these studies suggest that recent veterans are likely to experience difficulty in 
the civilian labor market. But these studies focus only on men and they apply only to earlier eras 
where the societal reception of military veterans may have been more unwelcoming. We 
elaborate and extend this work by looking at female veterans during a time of war fought 
exclusively with volunteers. 5 
 
EXPLANATIONS FOR VETERANS’ LABOR MARKET OUTCOMES 
What explains the employment and earnings differences between veterans and nonveterans, and 
why does this veteran effect vary by race?  The literature on the labor market consequences of 
military service offers several possible mechanisms by which veteran and nonveteran 
employment and wage outcomes might differ: 1) the selectivity of those who serve, 2) the loss or 
gain in human capital from military training and experience, 3) changes in social and cultural 
capital by the “bridging” environment of the military, and 4) the signaling or screening role of 
military experience. 
Selection 
Military enlistment is not a random event, and those who join differ from their nonserving 
counterparts in numerous ways. Several selection processes are important to note in studying 
military veterans. Enlistees are highly self-selected. Men who choose military service differ 
systematically from those who go to work or enroll in college (Kleykamp 2006; Mare and 
Winship 1984). Enlistees tend to have lower socioeconomic status, non-college-educated parents, 
lower grades and no college plans (Bachman et al. 2000; Kilburn 1992; Kilburn and Asch 2003; 
Kilburn and Klerman 1999; Teachman, Call, and Segal 1993a,b). More advantaged individuals 
likely self-select into other civilian institutions, like college or the skilled labor force. 
The military also selects which applicants to accept. Potential enlistees must exceed a set of 
human capital attributes required by the military to be eligible. Currently more than 90 percent of 
military enlistees have a high school diploma, and those who hold a GED must meet higher 
ability standards evaluated by the Armed Forces qualifying Test (AFQT) (Department of Defense 6 
 
2006). Enlistees must meet a stringent set of moral criteria excluding those with felony 
convictions without a waiver (Asch et al. 2009). Because of these minimum requirements, 
military members are positively selected from the general population on characteristics important 
to employers. 
Finally, veterans are individuals who chose to leave military service or were forced to do so 
by the military. Becoming a veteran also involves a selective process of separation from the 
military. Expulsion from the military for disciplinary or legal violations, or for failure to maintain 
military standards of fitness or performance would indicate a negative selection process. 
Individuals choosing to leave with an honorable discharge may do so either because they 
expected better opportunities in the civilian labor market (and are likely positively selected on 
productivity) or because they perceived they would not be promoted in the up-or-out military 
hierarchy (likely negatively selected on productivity). 
Changes in Human Capital 
Military service transforms those who serve by increasing human capital endowments through 
education, training, and work experience. Veterans gain training and skills, which may or may 
not be directly transferable to the civilian sector (Barley 1998; Goldberg and Warner 1987; 
Mangum and Ball 1987, 1989). Military service may also facilitate later educational attainment 
that increases employment probabilities and earnings (Bound and Turner 2002; Fligstein 1976; 
Little and Fredland 1979). But military service implies a trade-off between military and civilian 
work experience and further education. Several studies suggest that military training and 
experience are less valuable than civilian experience or education, and that time spent in the 7 
 
military is disadvantageous as it implies a loss of civilian work experience (Mangum and Ball 
1987, 1989). 
Changes in Cultural Capital 
In addition to the human capital development from military service, other explanations for 
veteran/nonveteran differences in employment or earnings reflect more subtle attributes acquired 
through service (Browning, Lopreato, and Poston 1973; Lopreato and Poston 1977). Evidence of 
an honorable discharge from the military provides certification that standards of behavior and 
performance were met during service and the veteran successfully adapted to the disciplined, 
hierarchical work environment in the military. Employers may perceive veterans as successful, 
reliable, adaptive employees. They may also be better equipped to succeed in large, bureaucratic 
firms. But employers may have negative perceptions of the military-specific norms and customs 
veterans learned while serving. Veterans may comport themselves in a more formal manner than 
most in the civilian workplace, and may have developed a sense of moral superiority to civilians 
(Ricks 1998). Military members are more politically conservative on average, and political views 
may also influence hiring agents against military applicants (Feaver and Kohn 2001). 
Military Service as a Signaling Device 
Another perspective incorporating the aforementioned ideas of the selective and transformative 
aspects of military service comes from signaling theory (Spence 1973), and suggests veteran 
status operates as a signal of the potential productivity of an individual by conveying additional 
information about veteran applicants to employers (Berger and Hirsch 1985; DeTray 1982; 8 
 
Fredland and Little 1985; Teachman and Call 1996; Teachman and Tedrow 2004; Xie 1992). The 
signaled information derives partly from the previously described process of self and institutional 
selection into and out of the military, but it depends heavily on employer understanding of those 
selection processes and on their perceptions of how military service transforms those who serve. 
Exactly what information is signaled to most employers is not well-understood, and the signal of 
prior military service likely contains a great deal of potentially conflicting information. 
RACE DIFFERENCES IN THE IMPACT OF MILITARY EXPERIENCE 
The meaning of the veteran signal likely varies by race. Blacks and Hispanics have lower high 
school graduation rates than whites. Black and Hispanic veterans are more positively selected 
relative to their peers than are whites (Asch et al. 2009). It has been argued that the quality of 
schooling may be lower for blacks and Hispanics, which may make education a less useful 
screening of productivity for these groups (Berger and Hirsch 1985). Because of the differences 
in the distribution of educational attainment and school quality among black, Hispanic, and white 
men, veteran status may provide more useful information on the productivity of black and 
Hispanic veterans relative to their nonveteran peers. 
Other research indicates that more productive blacks choose to enlist in the military because 
of discrimination in the civilian labor market that devalues their skills and ability, channeling 
them into dead end jobs with little opportunity for advancement (Mare and Winship 1984; 
Moskos and Butler 1996; Segal, Bachman, and Dowdell 1978; Teachman, Call, and Segal 
1993a,b). The military is perceived by minorities to be a more egalitarian workplace (Moskos and 9 
 
Butler 1996; Segal, Bachman, and Dowdell 1978; Segal 1989). Veteran status should therefore 
operate as a stronger signal of productivity among blacks in particular. 
The “bridging hypothesis” suggests that military service functions as a way for those with 
less advantaged backgrounds to acquire the attributes and attitudes of mainstream society, and to 
further their socioeconomic attainment (Browning, Lopreato, and Poston 1973; Lopreato and 
Poston 1977). The hypothesis applies both to racial and ethnic minorities and to whites from 
economically disadvantaged backgrounds. By exposing these individuals to the disciplined, 
bureaucratic military environment, military service is expected to provide social and cultural 
training aiding disadvantaged individuals in successfully working in mainstream (majority) 
culture. This argument implies that military service provides both occupational training and 
social and cultural training that may be transferable and valuable in the civilian sector. 
Why might military service be perceived as beneficial for racial minorities?  Industrial 
restructuring and the increase in the service sector of the American economy has shifted the kinds 
of skills and attributes employers seek from job applicants. Included are technical skills like 
reading, writing, arithmetic, and the use of computers, but also soft skills like motivation, 
attitude, reliability, and ability to work with others. In fact, it is these soft skills that employers 
find most important: 74 percent of employers interviewed said they were the most important 
skills being sought in entry-level job applicants (Holzer 1996; Moss and Tilly 1996, 2001). 
Because employers view racial and ethnic minorities as lacking these soft skills, black men in 
particular have faced difficulty finding jobs in the new economy (Pager 2003, 2005; Pager and 
Quillian 2005). Moss and Tilly (2001) suggest that employers perceive blacks to have a particular 
lack of skills in communication and motivation. Prior honorable military service from a black 10 
 
applicant may serve as a signal s/he has the soft skills desired in employees. If employers feel 
military service does not offer such remedial social training to whites because they already have 
these skills, then they are not likely to gain advantage in hiring from military experience. 
PRIOR RESEARCH ON FEMALE VETERANS: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
While research specifically investigating the consequences of military service among women is 
sparse, a few studies have addressed the postservice economic outcomes among female veterans. 
Using 1990 Census data, Prokos and Padavic (2000) find that female veterans earned less than 
their nonveterans peers after controlling for demographic and human capital differences. They 
did find evidence of a veteran premium among older, pre-AVF veterans, suggesting that military 
service among “trailblazing” women was relatively advantageous at a time when fewer 
nonveterans were working, particularly in male-dominated occupations. 
Cooney et al. (2003) also used 1990 Census data, finding that there was no advantage to 
military service among black women; they showed similar incomes to their nonveteran peers. 
White women veterans appeared disadvantaged relative to comparable nonveterans. Cooney et al. 
conceive of these effects as not a reflection of the effect of military service, but as indications of 
the different relative opportunity structures for nonserving black and white women. If the civilian 
opportunities for black women are more limited than those for white women, then black veterans 
may appear more advantaged relative to nonveterans than white veterans relative to white 
nonveterans. 11 
 
Mehay and Hirsch (1996) use a unique dataset to examine the effect of active military service 
among a group of women reservists. Using these data they are able to better control for the 
selectivity of female veterans. Women veterans may have some unobserved characteristic that 
both makes them more likely to be a veteran and to have high earnings—in the absence of 
military service, these women would still be expected to show higher earnings due to this 
unmeasured attribute (such a motivation, ability, etc.). Mehay and Hirsch (1996) find a 9 percent 
wage penalty among all female veterans, with a 12 percent penalty among whites and a 2 percent 
penalty among black female veterans relative to their nonveterans peers. 
The three prior studies of female veterans focused on earnings, finding that female veterans faced 
an earnings penalty for their service, net of demographic and other controls. Only women serving 
before the volunteer force appear to have benefitted from their military service (in terms of 
earnings). Their findings confirm the racial aspect of the bridging hypothesis, that women of 
color were less disadvantaged by their service, but the theory does not appear to extend to women 
as a whole. These studies do not investigate employment specifically, nor are they able to tease 
out the mechanisms generating low veteran earnings among women. By focusing attention on 
employment, the current study complements prior work on earnings and by including the 
experimental component, we can evaluate whether or not military service is a salient indicator to 
employers in the hiring process. 
DATA AND METHODS 12 
 
This paper employs two sources of data to examine employment patterns among female veterans. 
First, observational data from the 2005–2007 American Community Survey offers the most up-
to-date, nationally representative data with enough observations to measure employment of 
female veterans and nonveterans. Observed veteran/nonveteran differences in these data may 
arise from a combination of unobserved individual compositional differences related to 
employment, from differences in job-seeking patterns between veterans and nonveterans, and 
from differences in employer preferences for hiring veterans. We focus on the last of these 
possible mechanisms, and we present data from an experimental, audit study of civilian hiring of 
veterans relative to equally qualified nonveterans to evaluate whether or not employers exhibit 
different preferences for hiring veterans. These audit data provide a causal account of the 
employer “demand-side” behaviors in hiring veterans. We briefly describe our two data sources 
below. 
ACS 2005–2007 Data 
Prior descriptive accounts of veteran employment patterns suggest a marked change from prior 
years (see, for example, BLS 2006); today’s young veterans are facing high unemployment rates 
compared with their contemporary civilian peers, and compared with veterans in earlier decades 
(BLS 2006). The 2005–2007 ACS data contain enough observations of female veterans for us to 
provide basic descriptive statistics on the employment status of veterans in the current labor 
market. These data also allow us to separate recent veterans (those leaving the service within the 
past year) from those who have been out of military service for a longer period of time. We also 
separate veterans into those who served before 9/11 and those who served after, treating that date 
as the beginning of a wartime service environment. While women are officially barred from 13 
 
combat occupational specialties in the military, women serving during wartime regularly face 
danger and many have experienced direct combat. 
Analyses are limited to those women at risk of military service in the AVF, which officially 
began in 1973. By 2005, women younger than 55 would have been eligible to serve in the AVF. 
We limit the sample further to those women age 35 or younger to concentrate on younger women 
who have neither established careers in the civilian workforce nor those who retired after 
spending a career in the military (service members are eligible after serving for 20 years.) We 
exclude 17 and 18 year olds to ensure that only those eligible to have served a minimum two-year 
commitment to the military would be included in the analysis. 
The sample is further restricted to those not currently serving in the military on active duty or 
with the National Guard or Reserves. The ACS data are not ideal in isolating these populations; 
thus we take a conservative approach, eliminating individuals reporting they are currently on 
active duty, those who have only National Guard or Reserve experience (it is unclear if this 
implies current or prior experience), those reporting a military industry or occupation, and those 
reporting armed forces work in the employment status recode variable. 
Both the census and ACS data have serious limitations for studying the causes of veteran’s 
employment outcomes. Military service, and thus veteran status, is nonrandomly determined; 
neither the census nor the ACS data include measures such as AFQT that would help account for 
the observable selectivity of female veterans. Because nearly all women serving in the AVF have 
a high school diploma, analysis is limited to those women with a diploma or GED to make the 
veteran and nonveteran sample less differentially selective on education. Further controls for the 
selectivity of military service on either observable or unobservable characteristics are not 14 
 
available. However, by using an experimental approach (described below) we can eliminate the 
influence of selection and evaluate the causal impact of military experience on the initial stages 
of hiring. Below we describe the details of our hiring experiment. 
The Audit Data 
The second source of data in this paper comes from an experimental study of civilian hiring. The 
experimental data help isolate the causal influence of prior military service on hiring and 
highlight the key role of employers as gatekeepers of civilian work. If veteran status is a salient 
signal or marker related to hiring, or wage setting, as prior researchers claim, then employers 
faced with equally qualified veteran and nonveteran job seekers should exhibit differential 
treatment of matched veteran and nonveteran job applicants. The audit data can only shed light 
on employer demand-side influences on observed veteran/nonveteran employment and do not 
tease out the influence of veterans supply-side behaviors that contribute to net patterns in labor 
market outcomes. However, these data provide powerful causal evidence for one of several 
mechanisms offered in prior research. 
For the experiment, we sent resumes of fictitious job applicants showing equivalent work 
experience in response to advertised job openings in the classified ads of large midwestern 
metropolitan area. These fictitious applicants differed in the presentation of characteristics of 
interest to the research; in this case, one applicant gained work experience while serving in the 
military. Specifically, the experimental design matches three applicants, one of whom has 
recently left the active duty Army, after a period of four years of service as a personnel specialist 
(equivalent to a human resources clerk). She is matched with two individuals with comparable 15 
 
civilian work experience as a human resource clerk and in retail sales (the veteran has similar 
experience before entering the military). One of the nonveterans has a high school diploma, while 
the other is a recent graduate of a local four-year, noncompetitive college. The veteran applicant 
is matched with two civilian peers to assess the effect of military service holding education 
constant and an assessment of the claim that military training may substitute for a college 
education. 
Applicant work histories and personal characteristics are chosen to represent the factors of 
interest to the study (military experience, race/ethnicity, sex, and education). Veteran status is 
indicated by a work history with a sequence of typical jobs in the Army and by an indicator on 
the resume of an honorable discharge from service after four years (a typical service obligation). 
Veteran resumes explicitly indicate a period of service in Iraq. Veteran applicants present a high 
school diploma and some college credits, as well as specific military vocational training relevant 
to their specialty (for example a six-week course on the military personnel system for an 
individual who worked as a personnel clerk in the military). Because a typical veteran serving 
four years would have been promoted at least once into a job with more responsibility, civilian 
resumes reflect a similar pattern of increased responsibility within a single occupation. 
By matching applicants on observable characteristics such as work experience, age, and by 
allocating socioeconomically and racially similar neighborhoods of current residence and high 
school, the experiment isolates differences in treatment to employer evaluation of that which does 
differ across applicants, namely prior military service. Fictitious identities are created for each 
applicant in a testing team, including name, phone number (linked only to a voicemail box), 
email address, and postal address. The choice of name is vital in that the race is conveyed to 16 
 
employers based solely on the use of a racially distinct name. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) 
establish the salience of racially distinctive names in hiring, although Fryer and Levitt (2004) 
criticize the study on the basis that racially distinctive names also convey information about class 
background. Their critique is less consequential for the proposed design, because there is not a 
direct test of the influence of applicant race on hiring. Primary interest is on the within-race 
treatment of veterans, with tests evaluating whether the veteran/nonveteran difference is greater 
among blacks or whites. The names and visual layout (font and formatting) of each resume are 
varied to control for any employer preference for resume layout or name. 
Evidence of differential treatment of military and civilian applicants comes from measuring 
whether employers call back applicants with military experience (to researcher-maintained 
voicemail accounts) more or less often than their civilian matched peers. Differences in callback 
rates between veterans and nonveterans indicate differential treatment at the initial stages of 
hiring only. While measuring callbacks is not the same as measuring actual employment offers, 
the interview decision screens out the vast majority of applicants early on and operates as a 
gateway to employment. Prior research suggests that the interview stage is when the most 
discriminatory behavior in hiring occurs (Mincy 1993). In a study of age discrimination, 76 
percent of the differential treatment overall occurred at the callback stage (Bendick, Brown, and 
Wall 1999). Results may thus understate the extent of differential treatment if differential 
treatment is cumulative over the application to offer process (Mincy 1993). Each “tester” is 
allocated a separate voicemail box with a similar outgoing message recorded on each. Similarly, 
email accounts are established for each race-resume type cell to monitor any emailed responses to 
the resumes. 17 
 
RESULTS 
Census and ACS data: Thick Description 
Tables 1 and 2 report key descriptive statistics of interest for female veterans and nonveterans for 
black and white women from the 2005–2007 ACS data. Primary interest centers on measures of 
labor market participation, employment-population ratios, and employment rates among those in 
the labor force. We also are interested in measuring the extent to which veterans gain footholds in 
the civilian labor market through public sector employment, where they have an explicit hiring 
preference. We also report key demographic measures of interest including measures of age, 
experience, education, marital status, and childbearing. Given the demands of a military job, 
many women delay marriage and childbearing while in service, and in fact they may seek to 
leave the military in order to marry and have children. 
In Table 1 we separate veterans into two groups: those reporting active duty military service 
in the past year and those reporting their service ended more than a year ago. We expect that the 
first group should be those in the immediate months after separation from service who likely face 
the most difficulty transitioning from military to civilian work. In Table 2 we separate veterans 
into those serving since 9/11 and those serving before 9/11, only to evaluate whether the 
experiences of veterans serving during wartime differ from those serving in earlier eras.  
Table 1 suggests the most recent veterans have the highest rates of labor force participation, 
the highest employment-population ratios, the highest rates of employment among those in the 
labor force, and extremely high rates of public sector employment (among those working). Fully 
60 percent of white recent veterans and nearly 70 percent of recent black veterans report working 18 
 
in the public sector, compared with 18 percent and 27 percent of white and black veterans who 
have spent more than a year as veterans. Sample sizes are small and we do not hold great 
confidence in these estimates, but they are suggestive and merit further inquiry. Comparing 
nonveterans and more established veterans, there is no indication of a systematic labor market 
disadvantage among white or black female veterans, except that more established white veterans 
appear to have lower employment (higher unemployment) than nonveterans. These veterans do 
show public sector employment rates roughly twice those of nonveterans; more than one quarter 
of the black female veterans working report doing so in the public sector as do nearly one-fifth of 
white female veterans. 
Given the suspiciously high rates of public sector employment among the most recent 
veterans in Table 1, we instead compare veterans who served before and since 9/11. Table 2 
reports these figures and shows similar results. Veterans serving since 9/11 show the highest 
labor force participation rates, the highest employment-population ratios, higher rates of 
employment than nonveterans and again, very high rates of public sector employment. White 
veterans serving since 9/11 are an exception, showing lower employment (high unemployment) 
than nonveterans or earlier serving veterans. This result does not hold among black veterans. 
More than a third of white and nearly half of black recent veterans report public sector 
employment.  
In both Tables 1 and 2, there are clear differences in age and potential experience and 
differences in educational attainment across the veterans and nonveteran groups. Further research 
will employ regression analysis to control for these compositional differences to see if the 
observed labor market differences stem from these demographic variations. But these two tables 19 
 
suggest there are little to no disadvantages associated with military service among women in 
terms of employment. The high rates of public sector employment among veterans make it clear 
that regressions of earnings and wages of veterans must account for employment sector. The 
descriptive results do leave open the possibility that white veterans may face some difficulty in 
employment, but the differences from nonveterans are not large. However, we cannot tell from 
these observational data alone whether observed patterns of employment stem from 
compositional differences on either observable demographic and human capital indicators, or 
from unobservable differences between the veterans and nonveteran groups. Further, employment 
differences may result from different job search strategies between veteran and nonveteran 
women. They may also result from differences in employer preference for female veterans in 
hiring. To evaluate this last mechanism we turn to the results of the experimental hiring study. 
Audit Results 
Figure 1 presents the weekly count of job ads identified by the research team for testing. The 
count reflects all advertisements (not a sample) for positions that do not require certification, 
college education, licensing, or any other formal credential or skill made explicit in the job ad. 
The ad also must provide a fax number where resumes can be sent in response. We conducted 
tests over the periods June–August,and November–March. The decline in the employment 
situation in the current labor market is evident, with the count of relevant ads dropping from a 
high of nearly 80 per week down to less than 5 per week by the end of the study period. Thus, our 
study reflects the treatment of veterans in the hiring process under increasingly difficult hiring 
conditions. 20 
 
Analysis of the audit data is relatively straightforward, focusing on the percent of resumes 
generating a callback from an employer, by test condition (military, high school, or college 
graduate). Tests were conducted for both white and black “teams.” Figure 2 reflects the callback 
rates for each condition, by race. The white team tested 306 employers, while the black team 
tested 294 employers (differences owing to random variation in invalid fax numbers across the 
ads, which were randomly assigned to race teams). Among the white team, 7.4 percent of the 
military resumes elicited a callback, whereas only 4.8 percent of the high school graduate and 3.4 
percent of the college graduate resumes (with equivalent work experience) received callbacks. 
Results among the black team were much the same, with 7.5 percent of the military resumes 
garnering a callback compared with 5.6 percent of the high school graduate and 4.0 percent of the 
college graduate resumes eliciting an employer response. 
Our experiment uses matched triplets, thus the Cochran’s Q statistic (the extension of the 
McNemar test to n-tuples) tests for equal treatment across the three matched conditions. In both 
the black and white team data, the Cochran’s Q rejects the null hypothesis of equal treatment 
across the three conditions (Qblack test: p<0.0001, Qwhite test: p<0.0001). Given overall 
evidence of unequal treatment, interest lies in whether each pairwise contrast shows evidence of 
equal or unequal treatment. Figure 2 suggests a hierarchy of employer preference for female job 
seekers, with military veterans at the top, high school graduates following, and recent college 
graduates at the bottom. Pairwise contrasts suggest only the Military-college contrast is 
statistically significant at traditional levels (p<0.05) for both the black and white teams. 
We also use a logistic regression model to assess whether or not a submitted resume elicited a 
callback, including dummy variables for test condition while controlling for the order in which 21 
 
                                                           
each condition was sent (i.e., was the military, high school, or college resume sent first) and a 
linear time trend as predictors. We include date to capture the secular decline in job prospects 
that may influence employer selectivity in calling back applicants. Following Pager, Western, 
and Bonaikowski (2009), who extend the results from Ghosh et al. (2000), we use a random 
effects model specification with an employer random effect, which “allows information about all 
three testers to contribute to inference about a contrast between any two” (p.14). The random 
effect model extends work on matched pairs to use within-triplet comparisons to account for the 
correlation between observations in the matched triplet.
1 
Table 3 summarizes the regression results. For both the black and white teams, the veteran-
college graduate contrast is statistically significant, but neither the veteran-high school, nor the 
high school-college contrast is significant at traditional levels. The finding that employers are 
least likely to callback the college graduate is surprising. Both the veteran and the high school 
graduate present evidence of some college credits, and all show functionally equivalent work 
experience, job stability patterns, and tenures in all jobs reflected on the resumes. We attribute 
this result to employers possibly evaluating these applicants as overqualified, or not being 
seriously interested in the position. Because we eliminated ads that required a college degree, our 
typical job may not appeal to many college graduates, and employers may be suspicious of such 
applicants. Even if there were slight differences in the format of the college resume that did not 
appeal to employers, we would not expect such presentational matters to present such large 
effects on callbacks. 
 
1 Similar results are obtained if we use a simple logistic regression model, adjusting the standard errors 
for clustering within employers using the Huber-White Sandwich estimator in the Stata software 
package. 22 
 
While not reaching traditional significance, the negative coefficients on the time measure 
show declining callback rates over time, and the larger negative estimate for the black team is 
consistent with research claiming minorities suffer first in an economic downturn. An earlier 
audit study of male veterans in New York suggested race differences in employer treatment of 
veterans (Kleykamp 2009); however, the results of the current experiment with female applicants 
in a different metropolitan location do not suggest significant race differences in overall callbacks 
or in the effect of military service. 
DISCUSSION 
Although prior research on female veterans finds a veteran disadvantage in earnings, and recent 
descriptive reports find high rates of unemployment among recent veterans, our study results find 
that women veterans show mostly equal or better labor market outcomes than their nonserving 
peers. Importantly we find no evidence of employer discrimination against veterans in hiring, 
rather that employers show a marked preference for female veterans over civilian peers. Our 
results hold for both white and black women. Our research results confirm the extension of the 
“bridging hypothesis” to women, and not just racial or ethnic minorities. 
Given that both the observational data and the experimental data reflect female veterans as 
having equal or better employment prospects and outcomes than their nonserving peers, further 
research is warranted to uncover the reasons for this advantage. Observational data on women are 
not well-suited to inform this question. Better would be employer-based surveys to capture 23 
 
dimensions of employer hiring and pay decision making, but unfortunately, available data on 
employers do not address questions about military service or veterans in the workplace. 
To fill this void, we are conducting employer interviews to better understand how military 
experience is evaluated by hiring agents, and what kinds of experiences employers have working 
with and hiring military veterans. We think this rich source of qualitative data will fill the gaps 
and greatly improve theorizing about the labor market consequences of military service by 
gathering evidence from those who are the gatekeepers to the civilian labor market. 
Future research should also more thoroughly investigate how military women manage family 
formation goals, military work, and decisions to leave the military for the civilian labor force. 
More broadly, future research that systematically captures data on those leaving the military, 
beyond simple exit surveys, would aid tremendously in generating a comprehensive portrait of 
the process of transition from military to civilian life. 24 
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Table 1: Descriptive Results from 2005-2007 ACS 
  Nonveteran  Veteran less than 
1yr 
Veteran 1yr or 
longer 
  White Black White Black  White  Black 
%  in labor force  77.0 78.9 86.3 91.7 77.0  81.7
Employment-population ratio (%  72.5  68.4  81.6  83.3  71.5  72.1 
Employment rate (among LF)  94.2  86.7  94.5  90.9  92.8  88.2 
% in public sector  12.9  14.8  60.8  66.9  18.8  26.9 
            
Age 26.9  26.9  25.5  26.1  29.5  29.6 
Potential experience  6.9  7.5  5.9  6.8  9.7  10.0 
Number of children  0.8  1.0  0.6  0.8  1.1  1.1 
% with child <6 years old  31.0  31.6  28.1  35.9  40.0  36.6 
% living in the South  33.8  57.3  42.0  67.8  42.9  70.0 
            
HS/GED 25.8  37.9  26.0  30.2  23.3  24.8 
Some college  42.2  43.8  54.9  57.5  55.6  57.9 
BA 24.0  13.8  13.1  9.7  16.4  12.9 
MA or higher  8.0  4.5  6.0  2.6  4.7  4.4 
            
Married 43.3  20.7  43.8  32.9  56.1  35.2 
Divorced, widowed, separated  8.0  8.5  12.2  14.2  20.6  21.7 
Never married  48.7  70.8  44.0  52.9  23.3  43.1 
            
Unweighted N  524,525  79,664 1,029  416  4,923  1,356 
NOTE: Sample includes only female high school graduates, age 19–35, not currently in military 
or NG/Reserves.  
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2005-2007 American Community Survey PUMS (Bureau of the 
Census 2010). 32 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Results from 2005–2007 ACS 







  White Black White Black White Black 
% in labor force  77.0 78.9 81.5 87.1 76.4 81.2 
Employment-population ratio  72.5  68.4  75.2  76.7  71.9  73.2 
Employment rate (among LF)  94.2  86.7  92.3  88.0  94.1  90.1 
% in public sector  12.9  14.8  35.4  44.6  20.4  30.6 
            
Age 26.9  26.9  26.3  26.7  31.0  31.0 
Potential experience  6.9  7.5  6.6  7.3  11.2  11.3 
Number of children 0.8  1.0  0.7  0.9  1.3  1.2 
% with child <6 years old  31.0  31.6  34.0  37.3  41.3  35.5 
% living in the South  33.8  57.3  41.2  68.2  44.2  70.8 
            
HS/GED 25.8  37.9  24.7  29.2  23.0  22.7 
Some college  42.2  43.8  56.3  56.9  54.7  58.9 
BA 24.0  13.8  13.7  11.4  17.6  12.8 
MA or higher  8.0  4.5  5.2  2.4  4.7  5.6 
            
Married 43.3  20.7  46.8  32.1  60.3  37.4 
Divorced, widowed, separated  8.0  8.5  15.2  16.8  22.6  23.1 
Never married  48.7  70.8  38.0  51.1  17.1  39.5 
            
Unweighted N  524,525  79,664 2,778 908  3,174 864 
NOTE: Sample includes only female high school graduates, age 19–35, not currently in military 
or NG/Reserves. 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2005-2007 American Community Survey PUMS (Bureau of the 
Census 2010).. 33 
 
Table 3: Random Effects Model of Callback for Black and White Tests 
  White    Black 
 Coefficient    Coefficient 
  Std. Err.    Std. Err. 
College graduate  -1.444 *    -1.266 * 
 -0.575     -0.546  
HS graduate  -0.75     -0.611  
 -0.512     -0.502  
Sent 2nd  0.008     0.803  
 -0.401     -0.543  
Sent 3rd  -0.284     0.45  
 -0.544     -0.545  
Date -0.004     -0.008 †
 
 
 -0.004     -0.005  
Intercept 59.601     141.95 †
 -76.383     -83.19  
ln(σ
2
ν)  2.154 **   2.68 ** 
 -0.312    -0.2  
σν  2.935 **   3.819 ** 
 
Ԓ 
-0.458    -0.381  
0.723 **   0.816 ** 
 -0.062     -0.03  
N 918     882  




  9.044    10.226
 
NOTE: Reference is veteran, sent 1
st. †p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01.  
Figure 1: Number of Job Ads Identified for Testing (by week) 
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Figure 2: Callback Rates of Veterans, and Nonveteran High School and College Graduates, 
by Race 
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